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Abstract
The change-point detection problem seeks to identify distributional changes at an unknown change-
point k∗ in a stream of data. This problem appears in many important practical settings involving personal
data, including biosurveillance, fault detection, finance, signal detection, and security systems. The
field of differential privacy offers data analysis tools that provide powerful worst-case privacy guarantees.
We study the statistical problem of change-point detection through the lens of differential privacy. We
give private algorithms for both online and offline change-point detection, analyze these algorithms
theoretically, and provide empirical validation of our results.
1 Introduction
The change-point detection problem seeks to identify distributional changes at an unknown change-point k∗
in a stream of data. The estimated change-point should be consistent with the hypothesis that the data
are initially drawn from pre-change distribution P0 but from post-change distribution P1 starting at the
change-point. This problem appears in many important practical settings, including biosurveillance, fault
detection, finance, signal detection, and security systems. For example, the CDC may wish to detect a
disease outbreak based on real-time data about hospital visits, or smart home IoT devices may want
to detect changes changes in activity within the home. In both of these applications, the data contain
sensitive personal information.
The field of differential privacy offers data analysis tools that provide powerful worst-case privacy
guarantees. Informally, an algorithm that is -differentially private ensures that any particular output
of the algorithm is at most e more likely when a single data entry is changed. In the past decade, the
theoretical computer science community has developed a wide variety of differentially private algorithms
for many statistical tasks. The private algorithms most relevant to this work are based on the simple
output perturbation principle that to produce an -differentially private estimate of some statistic on the
database, we should add to the exact statistic noise proportional to ∆/, where ∆ indicates the sensitivity
of the statistic, or how much it can be influenced by a single data entry.
We study the statistical problem of change-point problem through the lens of differential privacy.
We give private algorithms for both online and offline change-point detection, analyze these algorithms
theoretically, and then provide empirical validation of these results.
1.1 Related work
The change-point detection problem originally arose from industrial quality control, and has since been
applied in a wide variety of other contexts including climatology [LR02], econometrics [BP03], and DNA
analysis [ZS12]. The problem is studied both in the offline setting, in which the algorithm has access to
the full dataset X = {x1, . . . , xn} up front, and in the online setting, in which data points arrive one at a
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time X = {x1, . . .}. Change-point detection is a canonical problem in statistics that has been studied
for nearly a century; selected results include [She31, Pag54, Shi63, Rob66, Lor71, Pol85, Pol87, Mou86,
Lai95, Lai01, Kul01, Mei06, Mei08, Mei10, Cha17].
Our approach is inspired by the commonly used Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) procedure [Pag54]. It
follows the generalized log-likelihood ratio principle, calculating
`(k) =
n∑
i=k
log
P1(xi)
P0(xi)
for each k ∈ [n] and declaring that a change occurs if and only if `(kˆ) ≥ T for MLE kˆ = argmaxk `(k)
and appropriate threshold T > 0. The existing change-point literature works primarily in the asymptotic
setting when k∗n/n→ r for some r ∈ (0, 1) as n→∞ (see, e.g., [Hin70, Car88]). In contrast, we consider
finite databases and provide the first accuracy guarantees for the MLE from a finite sample (n <∞).
In offering the first algorithms for private change-point detection, we primarily use two powerful tools
from the differential privacy literature. ReportMax [DR14] calculates noisy approximations of a stream
of queries on the database and reports which query produced the largest noisy value. We instantiate this
with partial log-likelihood queries to produce a private approximation of the the change-point MLE in
the offline setting. AboveThresh [DNR+09] calculates noisy approximations of a stream of queries on
the database iteratively and aborts as soon as a noisy approximation exceeds a specified threshold. We
extend our offline results to the harder online setting, in which a bound on k∗ is not known a priori, by
using AboveThresh to identify a window of fixed size n in which a change is likely to have occurred so
that we can call our offline algorithm at that point to estimate the true change-point.
1.2 Our results
We use existing tools from differential privacy to solve the change-point detection problem in both offline
and online settings, neither of which have been studied in the private setting before.
Private offline change-point detection. We develop an offline private change-point detection
algorithm OfflinePCPD (Algorithm 3) that is accurate under one of two assumptions about the
distributions from which data are drawn. As is standard in the privacy literature, we give accuracy
guarantees that bound the additive error of our estimate of the true change-point with high probability.
Our accuracy theorem statements (Theorems 5 and 7) also provide guarantees for the non-private
estimator for comparison. Since traditional statistics typically focuses on the the asymptotic consistency
and unbiasedness of the estimator, ours are the first finite-sample accuracy guarantees for the standard
(non-private) MLE. As expected, MLE accuracy decreases with the sensitivity of the measured quantity
but increases as the pre- and post-change distribution grow apart. Interestingly, it is constant with respect
to the size of the database. In providing MLE bounds alongside accuracy guarantees for our private
algorithms, we are able to quantify the cost of privacy as roughly DKL(P0||P1)/.
We are able to prove -differential privacy under the first distributional assumption, which is that
the measured quantity has bounded sensitivity ∆(`), by instantiating the general-purpose ReportMax
algorithm from the privacy literature with our log-likelihood queries (Theorem 4). Importantly and
in contrast to our accuracy results, the distributional assumption need only apply to the hypothesized
distributions from which data are drawn; privacy holds for arbitrary input databases. We offer a limited
privacy guarantee for our second distributional assumption, ensuring that if an individual data point is
drawn from one of the two hypothesized distributions, redrawing that data from either of the distributions
will not be detected, regardless of the composition of the rest of the database (Theorem 6).
Private online change-point detection. In OnlinePCPD (Algorithm 4), we extend our online
results to the offline setting by using the AboveThresh framework to first identify a window in which the
change is likely to have happened and then call the offline algorithm to identify a more precise approximation
of when it occurred. Standard -differential privacy under our first distributional assumption follows from
composition of the underlying privacy mechanisms (Theorem 8).1 Accuracy of our online mechanism
1We note that we can relax our distributional assumption and get a weaker privacy guarantee as in the offline setting if
desired.
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relies on appropriate selection of the threshold that identifies a window in which a change-point has likely
occurred, at which point the error guarantees are inherited from the offline algorithm (Theorem 9).
Empirical validation. Finally, we run several Monte Carlo experiments to validate our theoretical
results for both the online and offline settings. We consider data drawn from Bernoulli and Gaussian
distributions, which satisfy our first and second distributional assumptions, respectively. Our offline
experiments are summarized in Figure 1, which shows that change-point detection is easier when P0 and
P1 are further apart and harder when the privacy requirement is stronger ( is smaller). Additionally,
these experiments enhance our theoretical results, finding that OfflinePCPD performs well even when
we relax the assumptions required for our theoretical accuracy bounds by running our algorithm on
imperfect hypotheses P0 and P1 that are closer together than the true distributions from which data are
drawn. Figure 2 shows that OnlinePCPD also performs well, consistent with our theoretical guarantees.
2 Preliminaries
Our work considers the statistical problem of change-point detection through the lens of differential
privacy. Section 2.1 defines the change-point detection problem, and Section 2.2 describes the differentially
private tools that will be brought to bear.
2.1 Change-point background
Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be n real-valued data points. The change-point detection problem is parametrized
by two distributions, P0 and P1. The data points in X are hypothesized to initially be sampled i.i.d. from
P0, but at some unknown change time k
∗ ∈ [n], an event may occur (e.g., epidemic disease outbreak) and
change the underlying distribution to P1. The goal of a data analyst is to announce that a change has
occurred as quickly as possible after k∗. Since the xi may be sensitive information—such as individuals’
medical information or behaviors inside their home—the analyst will wish to announce the change-point
time in a privacy-preserving manner.
In the standard non-private offline change-point literature, the analyst wants to test the null hypothesis
H0 : k
∗ =∞, where x1, . . . , xn ∼iid P0, against the composite alternate hypothesis H1 : k∗ ∈ [n], where
x1, . . . , xk∗−1 ∼iid P0 and xk∗ , . . . , xn ∼iid P1. The log-likelihood ratio of k∗ =∞ against k∗ = k is given
by
`(k,X) =
n∑
i=k
log
P1(xi)
P0(xi)
. (1)
The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of the change time k∗ is given by
kˆ(X) = argmaxk∈[n]`(k,X). (2)
When X is clear from context, we will simply write `(k) and kˆ.
An important quantity in our accuracy analysis will be the Kullback-Leibler distance between
probability distributions P0 and P1, defined as DKL(P1||P0) =
∫∞
−∞ P1(x) log
P1(x)
P0(x)
dx = Ex∼P1 [log
P1(x)
P0(x)
].
We always use log to refer to the natural logarithm, and when necessary, we interpret log 0
0
= 0.
We will measure the additive error of our estimations of the true change point as follows.
Definition 1 ((α, β)-accuracy). A change-point detection algorithm that produces a change-point estimator
k˜(X) where a distribution change occurred at time k∗ is (α, β)-accurate if Pr[|k˜− k∗| < α] ≥ 1− β, where
the probability is taken over randomness of the algorithm and sampling of X.
2.2 Differential privacy background
Differential privacy bounds the maximum amount that a single data entry can affect analysis performed
on the database. Two databases X,X ′ are neighboring if they differ in at most one entry.
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06]). An algorithm M : Rn → R is (, δ)-differentially private
if for every pair of neighboring databases X,X ′ ∈ Rn, and for every subset of possible outputs S ⊆ R,
Pr[M(X) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[M(X ′) ∈ S] + δ.
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If δ = 0, we say that M is -differentially private.
One common technique for achieving differential privacy is by adding Laplace noise. The Laplace
distribution with scale b is the distribution with probability density function: Lap(x|b) = 1
2b
exp
(
− |x|
b
)
.
We will write Lap(b) to denote the Laplace distribution with scale b, or (with a slight abuse of notation)
to denote a random variable sampled from Lap(b).
The sensitivity of a function or query f is defined as ∆(f) = maxneighbors X,X′ |f(X)− f(X ′)|. The
Laplace Mechanism of [DMNS06] takes in a function f , database X, and privacy parameter , and outputs
f(X) + Lap(∆(f)/).
Our algorithms rely on two existing differentially private algorithms, ReportMax [DR14] and
AboveThresh [DNR+09]. The ReportMax algorithm takes in a collection of queries, computes a noisy
answer to each query, and returns the index of the query with the largest noisy value. We use this as the
framework for our offline private change-point detector OfflinePCPD in Section 3 to privately select
the time k with the highest log-likelihood ratio `(k).
Algorithm 1 Report Noisy Max : ReportMax(X,∆, {f1, . . . , fm}, )
Input: database X, set of queries {f1, . . . , fm} each with sensitivity ∆, privacy parameter 
for i = 1, . . . ,m do
Compute fi(X)
Sample Zi ∼ Lap(∆ )
end for
Output i∗ = argmax
i∈[m]
(fi(X) + Zi)
Theorem 1 ([DR14]). ReportMax is (, 0)-differentially private.
The AboveThresh algorithm, first introduced by [DNR+09] and refined to its current form by [DR14],
takes in a potentially unbounded stream of queries, compares the answer of each query to a fixed noisy
threshold, and halts when it finds a noisy answer that exceeds the noisy threshold. We use this algorithm
as a framework for our online private change-point detector OnlinePCPD in Section 4 when new data
points arrive online in a streaming fashion.
Algorithm 2 Above Noisy Threshold: AboveThresh(X,∆, {f1, f2, . . .}, T, )
Input: database X, stream of queries {f1, f2, . . .} each with sensitivity ∆, threshold T , privacy
parameter 
Let Tˆ = T + Lap( 2∆ )
for each query i do
Let Zi ∼ Lap( 4∆ )
if fi(X) + Zi > Tˆ then
Output ai = >
Halt
else
Output ai = ⊥
end if
end for
Theorem 2 ([DNR+09]). AboveThresh is (, 0)-differentially private.
Theorem 3 ([DNR+09]). For any sequence of m queries f1, . . . , fm with sensitivity ∆ such that |{i < m :
fi(X) ≥ T−α}| = 0, AboveThresh outputs with probability at least 1−β a stream of a1, . . . , am ∈ {>,⊥}
such that ai = ⊥ for every i ∈ [m] with f(i) < T − α and ai = > for every i ∈ [m] with f(i) > T + α as
long as
α ≥ 8∆ log(2m/β)

.
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2.3 Concentration inequalities
Our proofs will use the following bounds.
Lemma 1 (Ottaviani’s inequality [VDVW96]). For independent random variables U1, . . . , Um, for Sk =∑
i∈[k] Ui for k ∈ [m], and for λ1, λ2 > 0, we have
Pr
[
max
1≤k≤m
|Sk| > λ1 + λ2
]
≤ Pr [|Sm| > λ1]
1−max1≤k≤m Pr [|Sm − Sk| > λ2] .
If we additionally assume the Uj above are i.i.d. with mean 0 and take values from an interval of
bounded length L, we can apply Hoeffding’s inequality for the following corollary:
Corollary 2. For independent and identically distributed random variables U1, . . . , Um with mean zero
strictly bounded by an interval of length L and for Sk =
∑
i∈[k] Ui for k ∈ [m], and for λ1, λ2 > 0, we have
Pr[ max
k∈[m]
|Sk| > λ1 + λ2] ≤ 2 exp(−2λ
2
1/(mL
2))
1− 2 exp(−2λ22/(mL2))
.
Lemma 3 (Bernstein inequality [VDVW96]). Let Y1, . . . , Yn be independent random variables with mean
zero such that E
[
e|Yi|/M − 1− |Yi|
M
]
M2 ≤ 1
2
vi for constants M and vi and for i ∈ [n]. Then
Pr[|Y1 + . . .+ Yn| > x] ≤ 2 exp
(
−1
2
x2
v +Mx
)
,
for v ≥ v1 + . . .+ vn.
Corollary 4. For independent and identically distributed random variables Y1, . . . , Yn with mean zero
such that E
[
e|Yi| − 1− |Yi|
]
≤ 1
2
v, for constant v and i ∈ [n], and for Sk =
∑
i∈[k] Yi for k ∈ [m], and
for λ1, λ2 > 0, we have
Pr[ max
k∈[m]
|Sk| > λ1 + λ2] ≤ 2 exp(−λ
2
1/(2mv + 2λ1))
1− 2 exp(−λ22/(2mv + 2λ2))
.
3 Offline private change-point detection
In this section, we investigate the differentially private change point detection problem in the setting
that n data points X = {x1, . . . , xn} are known to the algorithm in advance. Given two hypothesized
distributions P0 and P1, our algorithm OfflinePCPD privately approximates the MLE kˆ of the change
time k∗. We provide accuracy bounds for both the MLE and the output of our algorithm under two
different assumptions about the distributions from which the data are drawn, summarized in Table 1.
Assumption MLE OfflinePCPD
A := ∆(`) <∞ 2A2C2 log 323β max
{
8A2
C2 log
64
3β ,
4A
C log
16
β
}
A := Aδ <∞ 67C2M log
64
3β max
{
262
C2M
log 1283β ,
2A log(16/β)
CM 
}
Table 1: Summary of non-private and private offline accuracy guarantees under H1.
The expressions ∆(`), Aδ, C, and CM are defined in (4), (5), (17), (18), resp.
The first assumption essentially requires that P1(x)/P0(x) cannot be arbitrarily large or arbitrarily
small for any x. We note that this assumption is not satisfied by several important families of distributions,
including Gaussians. The second assumption, motivated by the δ > 0 relaxation of differential privacy,
instead requires that the x for which this log ratio exceeds some bound Aδ have probability mass at
most δ.
Although the accuracy of OfflinePCPD only holds under the change-point model’s alternate
hypothesis H1, it is -differentially private for any hypothesized distributions P0, P1 with finite ∆(`) and
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privacy parameters  > 0, δ = 0 regardless of the distributions from which X is drawn. We offer a similar
but somewhat weaker privacy guarantee when ∆(`) is infinite but Aδ is finite, which roughly states that a
data point sampled from either P0 or P1 can be replaced with a fresh sample from either P0 or P1 without
detection.
3.1 Offline algorithm
Our proposed offline algorithm OfflinePCPD applies the report noisy max algorithm [DR14] to the
change-point problem by adding noise to partial log-likelihood ratios `(k) used to estimate the change
point MLE kˆ. The algorithm chooses Laplace noise parameter A/ depending on input hypothesized
distributions P0, P1 and privacy parameters , δ and then outputs
k˜ = argmax
1≤k≤n
{`(k) + Zk}. (3)
Our algorithm can be easily modified to additionally output an approximation of `(k˜) and incur 2 privacy
cost by composition.
Algorithm 3 Offline private change-point detector : OfflinePCPD(X,P0, P1, , δ, n)
Input: database X, distributions P0, P1, privacy parameters , δ, database size n
if δ = 0 then
Set A = maxx log
P1(x)
P0(x)
−minx′ log P1(x
′)
P0(x′)
. set A = ∆` as in (4)
else
Set A = min{t : maxi=0,1 Prx∼Pi [2| log P1(x)P0(x) | > t] < δ/2} . set A = Aδ as in (5)
end if
for k = 1, . . . , n do
Compute `(k) =
∑n
i=k log
P1(xi)
P0(xi)
Sample Zk ∼ Lap(A )
end for
Output k˜ = argmax
1≤k≤n
{`(k) + Zk} . Report noisy argmax
In the change-point or statistical process control (SPC) literature, when the pre- and post- change
distributions are unknown in practical settings, researchers often choose hypotheses P0, P1 with the
smallest justifiable distance. While it is easier to detect and accurately estimate a larger change, larger
changes are often associated with a higher-sensitivity MLE, requiring more noise (and therefore additional
error) to preserve privacy. We propose that practitioners using our private change point detection
algorithm choose input hypotheses accordingly. This practical setting is considered in our numerical
studies, presented in Section 5.
In the case that δ = 0, we sample Laplace noise directly proportional to the sensitivity of the partial
log-likelihood ratios we compute:
∆` = max
k∈[n],X,X′∈Rn
‖X−X′‖
1
=1
∥∥`(k,X)− `(k,X ′)∥∥
1
= max
x∈R
log
P1(x)
P0(x)
− min
x′∈R
log
P1(x
′)
P0(x′)
. (4)
The algorithm should not be invoked with δ = 0 unless ∆(`) is finite. In the case that ` has infinite
sensitivity, we instead allow the user to select a privacy parameter δ > 0 and identify a value Aδ for which
most values of x ∼ P0, P1 have bounded log-likelihood ratio:
Aδ = min
{
t : max
i=0,1
Pr
x∼Pi
[
2|log P1(x)
P0(x)
| > t
]
< δ/2
}
. (5)
As a concrete canonical example, ∆(`) is unbounded for two Gaussian distributions, but Aδ is bounded
for Gaussians with different means as follows:
Example 1. For P0 = N (0, 1), P1 = N (µ, 1), and δ > 0, we have Aδ = 2µ[Φ−1(1− δ/2) + µ/2], where
Φ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution.
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3.2 Theoretical properties under the uniform bound assumption
In this subsection, we prove privacy and accuracy of OfflinePCPD when δ = 0 and P0, P1 are such that
∆(`) is finite. Note that if ∆(`) is infinite, then the algorithm will simply add noise with infinite scale
and will still be differentially private.
Theorem 4. For arbitrary data X, OfflinePCPD(X,P0, P1, , 0) is (, 0)-differentially private.
Proof. Privacy follows by instantiation of ReportMax [DR14] with queries `(k) for k ∈ [n], which have
sensitivity A = ∆(`); this proof is included for completeness.
Fix any two neighboring databases X,X ′ that differ on index j. For any k ∈ [n], denote the respective
partial log-likelihood ratios as `(k) and `′(k). By (1), we have
`′(k) = `(k) + ∆I{j ≥ k} with ∆ = log P1(x
′
j)
P0(x′j)
− log P1(xj)
P0(xj)
. (6)
Next, for a given 1 ≤ i ≤ n, fix Z−i, a draw from [Lap(A/)]n−1 used for all the noisy log likelihood
ratio values except the ith one. We will bound from above and below the ratio of the probabilities that
the algorithm outputs k˜ = i on inputs X and X ′. Define the minimum noisy value in order for i to be
select with X:
Z∗i = min{Zi : `(i) + Zi > `(k) + Zk ∀k 6= i}
If ∆ < 0, then for all k 6= i we have
`′(i) +A+ Z∗i ≥ `(i) + Z∗i > `(k) + Zk ≥ `′(k) + Zk.
If ∆ ≥ 0, then for all k 6= i we have
`′(i) + Z∗i ≥ `(i) + Z∗i > `(k) + Zk ≥ `′(k)−A+ Zk.
Hence, Z′i ≥ Z∗i +A ensures that the algorithm outputs i on input X ′, and the theorem follows from the
following inequalities for any fixed Z−i, with probabilities over the choice of Zi ∼ Lap(A/).
Pr[k˜ = i | X ′, Z−i] ≥ Pr[Z′i ≥ Z∗i +A | Z−i] ≥ e− Pr[Zi ≥ Z∗i | Z−i] = e− Pr[k˜ = i | X,Z−i]
Next we provide accuracy guarantees of the standard (non-private) MLE kˆ and the output k˜ of our
private algorithm OfflinePCPD when the data are drawn from P0, P1 with true change point k
∗ ∈ (1, n).
By providing both bounds, Theorem 5 quantifies the cost of requiring privacy in change point detection.
Our result for the standard (non-private) MLE is the first finite-sample accuracy guarantee for this
estimator. Such non-asymptotic properties have not been previously studied in traditional statistics,
which typically focuses on consistency and unbiasedness of the estimator, with less attention to the
convergence rate. We show that the additive error of the MLE is constant with respect to the sample
size, which means that the convergence rate is OP (1). That is, it converges in probability to the true
change-point k∗ in constant time.
Note that accuracy depends on two measures A and C of the distances between distributions P0 and
P1. Accuracy both of MLE kˆ and OfflinePCPD output k˜ is best for distributions for which A = ∆(`) is
small relative to KL-divergence, which is consistent with the intuition that larger changes are easier to
detect but output sensitivity degrades the robustness of the estimator and requires more noise for privacy,
harming accuracy.
A technical challenge that arises in proving accuracy of the private estimator is that the xi are not
identically distributed when the true change-point k∗ ∈ (1, n], and so the partial log-likelihood ratios
`(k) are dependent across k. Hence we need to investigate the impact of adding i.i.d. noise draws
to a sequence of `(k) that may be neither independent nor identically distributed. Fortunately, the
differences `(k)− `(k + 1) = log P1(xk)
P0(xk)
are piecewise i.i.d. This property is key in our proof. Moreover,
we show that we can divide the possible outputs of the algorithm into regions that of doubling size with
exponentially decreasing probability of being selected by the algorithm, resulting in accuracy bounds that
are independent of the number of data points n.
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Theorem 5. For hypotheses P0, P1 such that ∆(`) < ∞ and n data points X drawn from P0, P1 with
true change time k∗ ∈ (1, n], the MLE kˆ is (α, β)-accurate for any β > 0 and
α =
2A2
C2
log
32
3β
. (7)
For hypotheses and data drawn this way with privacy parameter  > 0, OfflinePCPD(X,P0, P1, , 0, n)
is (α, β)-accurate for any β > 0 and
α = max
{
8A2
C2
log
64
3β
,
4A
C
log
16
β
}
. (8)
In both expressions, A = ∆(`) and C = min{DKL(P1||P0), DKL(P0||P1)}.
Proof. Our goal is to find some expression for α such that we can bound the probability of the bad event
that OfflinePCPD outputs k˜ such that |k˜ − k∗| > α with probability at most β, where k∗ is the true
change point. The first half of our analysis will yield another bound giving accuracy of the MLE kˆ.
Our proof is structured around the following observation. The algorithm only outputs a particular
incorrect k˜ 6= k∗ if there exists some k in with `(k) + Zk > `(k∗) + Zk∗ for a set of random noise values
{Zk}k∈[n] selected by the algorithm. For the algorithm to output an incorrect value, there must either
be a k that nearly beats the true change point on the noiseless data or there must be a k that receives
much more noise than k∗. Intuitively, this captures the respective scenarios that unusual data causes
non-private ERM to perform poorly and that unusual noise draws causes our private algorithm to perform
poorly.
Given some true change-point k∗ and error tolerance α > 0, we can partition the set of bad possible
outputs k into sub-intervals of exponentially increasing size as follows. For i ≥ 1, let
R−i = [k
∗ − 2iα, k∗ − 2i−1α)
R+i = (k
∗ + 2i−1α, k∗ + 2iα]
Ri = R
−
i ∪R+i
Then for any range-specific thresholds ti for i ≥ 1, our previous observations allow us to bound the
probability of the bad event as follows:
Pr[|k˜ − k∗| > α] ≤
∑
i≥1
Pr[max
k∈Ri
{`(k)− `(k∗)} > −ti] +
∑
i≥1
Pr[max
k∈Ri
{Zk − Zk∗} ≥ ti] (9)
We bound each term in the above expression separately for ti = 2
i−2αC. For accuracy of the
non-private MLE, we will set α to ensure that the first term is at most β. For accuracy of the private
algorithm, we will set α to ensure that each term is at most β/2. The first and more difficult task requires
us to reason about the probability that the log-likelihood ratios for the data are not too far away from
their expectation. Although the `(k) are not independent, their pairwise differences `(k + 1)− `(k) are,
so we can apply our corollary of Ottaviani’s inequality to bound the probability that `(k) significantly
exceeds `(k∗) by appropriately defining several random variables corresponding to a data stream X drawn
according to the change-point model.
Specifically, we can decompose the empirical log-likelihood difference between the true change-point
k∗ and any candidate k into the sum of i.i.d. random variables with mean zero and the expected value of
this difference as follows:
Uj =
{
− log P0(xj)
P1(xj)
+DKL(P0||P1), j < k∗
− log P1(xj)
P0(xj)
+DKL(P1||P0), j ≥ k∗
`(k)− `(k∗) =
{∑k∗−1
j=k Uj − (k∗ − k)DKL(P0||P1), k < k∗∑k−1
j=k∗ Uj − (k − k∗)DKL(P1||P0), k ≥ k∗
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We also define random variable Sm to denote the sum of m i.i.d. random variables as follows, noting
that Sm is distributed like
∑k∗−1
j=k∗+m Uj for m < 0 and like
∑k∗+m−1
j=k∗ Uj for m > 0.
Sm =
{∑
k∗+m≤j<k∗ Uj , m < 0∑
k∗≤j<k∗+m Uj m > 0
With these random variables, we bound each term in the first set of terms in (9) for any i ≥ 1 and
threshold ti = 2
i−2αC as follows:
Pr[max
k∈Ri
{`(k)− `(k∗)} > −2i−2αC]
≤ Pr[ max
k∈R−i
{
k∗−1∑
j=k
Uj − (k∗ − k)DKL(P0||P1)} > −2i−2αC]
+ Pr[ max
k∈R+i
{
k−1∑
j=k∗
Uj − (k − k∗)DKL(P1||P0)} > −2i−2αC]
≤ Pr[ max
k∈[2i−1α]
|S−k| > 2i−2αC] + Pr[ max
k∈[2i−1α]
|Sk| > 2i−2αC]
≤ 4 · exp(−2
i−4αC2/A2)
1− 2 · exp(−2i−4αC2/A2) (10)
≤ 8 exp(−2i−4αC2/A2) (11)
= 8
(
exp(
−αC2
8A2
)
)2i−1
where (13) follows from an application of Corollary 2 with λ1 = λ2 = 2
i−3αC and L = A, and
the denominator can be simplified as in (14) under the assumption that α ≥ 8A2 log 4
C2
to simplify the
denominator, which is satisfied by our final bounds.
We now consider the sum of these terms over all i, which will be needed for the final bound on
Equation (9). We note that this sum is bounded above by a geometric series with ratio exp(−αC2/(8A2))
since 2i−1 ≥ i, yielding the second inequality. Then the same assumed lower bound on α is used to
simplify the denominator as in (14):
∑
i≥1
Pr[max
k∈Ri
{`(k)− `(k∗)} > −2i−2αC] ≤ 8
∑
i≥1
(
exp(
−αC2
8A2
)
)2i−1
≤ 8
∑
i≥1
(
exp(
−αC2
8A2
)
)i
≤ 8 exp(
−αC2
8A2
)
1− exp(−αC2
8A2
)
≤ 32
3
exp
(−αC2
8A2
)
(12)
The first term in (8) in the theorem statement ensures that the expression above is bounded by β/2,
as is required for the private algorithm.
For non-private MLE, we bound each term in the first set of terms in (9) for any i ≥ 1 and threshold
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ti = 0 as follows:
Pr[max
k∈Ri
{`(k)− `(k∗)} > 0]
≤ Pr[ max
k∈R−i
{
k∗−1∑
j=k
Uj − (k∗ − k)DKL(P0||P1)} > 0]
+ Pr[ max
k∈R+i
{
k−1∑
j=k∗
Uj − (k − k∗)DKL(P1||P0)} > 0]
≤ Pr[ max
k∈[2i−1α]
|S−k| > 2i−1αC] + Pr[ max
k∈[2i−1α]
|Sk| > 2i−1αC]
≤ 4 · exp(−2
i−2αC2/A2)
1− 2 · exp(−2i−2αC2/A2) (13)
≤ 8 exp(−2i−2αC2/A2) (14)
= 8
(
exp(
−αC2
2A2
)
)2i−1
Summing these terms over all i,
∑
i≥1
Pr[max
k∈Ri
{`(k)− `(k∗)} > 0] ≤ 8
∑
i≥1
(
exp(
−αC2
2A2
)
)2i−1
≤ 8
∑
i≥1
(
exp(
−αC2
2A2
)
)i
≤ 8 exp(
−αC2
2A2
)
1− exp(−αC2
2A2
)
≤ 32
3
exp
(−αC2
2A2
)
. (15)
For α as in (7) in the theorem statement, the expression above is bounded by β, completing the accuracy
proof for the non-private MLE.
Next we bound the second set of terms in (9), controlling the probability that large noise draws cause
large inaccuracies for the private algorithm. Since each Zk and Zk∗ are independent draws from a Laplace
distribution with parameter A/, this bound follows from a union bound over all indices in Ri and the
definition of the Laplace distribution:
Pr[max
k∈Ri
{Zk − Zk∗} ≥ 2i−2αC] ≤ Pr[2 max
k∈Ri
|Zk| ≥ 2i−2αC]
≤ 2iαPr[|Lap(A/)| ≥ 2i−3αC]
≤ 2iα · exp(−2i−3αC/A)
= 2iα
(
exp(
−αC
4A
)
)2i−1
Then by summing over all ranges and assuming in (16) that α ≥ 4A ln 2
C
to simplify the denominator,
we obtain a bound on the probability of large noise applied to any possible k far from k∗.
∑
i≥1
Pr[max
k∈Ri
{Zk − Zk∗} > 2i−2αC] ≤ α
∑
i≥1
2i(exp(−αC/(4A)))2i−1
≤ α2
∑
i≥1
i(exp(−αC/(4A)))i
= α2
exp(−αC/(4A))
(1− exp(−αC/(4A)))2
≤ 8α exp(−αC/(4A)) (16)
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Since x/2 ≥ lnx, requiring α ≥ 4A log(16/β)
C
suffices to ensure that (16) is at most β/2 as required.
By Inequality 9, this guarantees that Pr[|k˜ − k∗| > α] ≤ β for the assumed ranges of α captured in
Equation (8) in the theorem statement, completing the proof.
3.3 Relaxing uniform bound assumptions
In this subsection, we prove accuracy and a limited notion of privacy for OfflinePCPD when δ > 0 and
P0, P1 are such that Aδ is finite. Since we are no longer able to uniformly bound logP1(x)/P0(x), these
accuracy results include worse constants than those in Section 3.2, but the relaxed assumption about
P0, P1 makes the results applicable to a wider range of distributions, including Gaussian distributions
(see Example 1). Note of course that for some pairs of very different distributions, such as distributions
with non-overlapping supports, the assumption that Aδ <∞ may still fail. A true change point k∗ can
always be detected with perfect accuracy given xk∗−1 and xk∗ , so we should not expect to be able to
offer any meaningful privacy guarantees for such distributions.
By similar rationale, relaxing the uniform bound assumption means that we may have a single data
point xj that dramatically increases `(k) for k ≥ j, so we cannot add noise proportional to ∆(`) and
privacy no longer follows from that of ReportMax. Instead we offer a weaker notion of privacy in
Theorem 6 below. As with the usual definition of differential privacy, we guarantee that the output of our
algorithm is similarly distributed on neighboring databases, only our notion of neighboring databases
depends on the hypothesized distributions. Specifically, the a single entry in X drawn from either P0 or
P1 may be replaced without detection by another entry drawn from either P0 or P1, even if the rest of
the database is arbitrary.
Theorem 6. For any , δ > 0, any hypotheses P0, P1 such that Aδ < ∞, any index j ∈ [n], any
i, i′ ∈ {0, 1}, and any x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+2, . . . , xn, let Xi = {x1, . . . , xn} denote the random variable with
xj ∼ Pi and let X ′i′ = {x1, . . . , xj−1, x′j , xj+1, . . . , xn} denote the random variable with x′j ∼ Pi′ . Then
for any S ⊆ [n], we have
Pr[OfflinePCPD(Xi, P0, P1, , δ, n) ∈ S] ≤ exp() · Pr[OfflinePCPD(X ′i′ , P0, P1, , δ, n) ∈ S] + δ,
where the probabilities are over the randomness of the algorithm and of Xi, X
′
i′ .
Proof. Define the event that the log-likelihood ratios of xj , x
′
j as in the theorem statement are bounded
by Aδ as follows:
Eδ :=
{∣∣∣∣log P1(xj)P0(xj) − log P1(x
′
j)
P0(x′j)
∣∣∣∣ < Aδ} .
Let k˜ = OfflinePCPD(Xi, P0, P1, , δ, n), k˜
′ = OfflinePCPD(X ′i′ , P0, P1, , δ, n). Then by Theo-
rem 4 and the observation that Pr[Ecδ ] < δ by definition of Aδ, we have that for any S ⊆ [n],
Pr[k˜ ∈ S] ≤ Pr[k˜ ∈ S|Eδ] Pr[Eδ] + Pr[Ecδ ]
≤ exp() Pr[k˜′ ∈ S|Eδ] Pr[Eδ] + δ
≤ exp() Pr[k˜′ ∈ S] + δ.
Allowing ∆(`) to be infinite precludes our use of Hoeffding’s inequality as in Theorem 5. The main
idea in the proof, however, can be salvaged by decomposing the change into a change from P0 to the
average distribution (P0 + P1)/2 and then the average distribution to P1. Correspondingly, we will use
CM , an alternate distance measure between P0 and P1, defined below next to C from the previous section
for comparison:
C = min {DKL(P0||P1), DKL(P1||P0)} (17)
CM = min
{
DKL(P0||P0 + P1
2
), DKL(P1||P0 + P1
2
)
}
= min
i=0,1
Ex∼Pi
[
log
2Pi(x)
P0(x) + P1(x)
]
(18)
Because (2Pi)/(P0 + P1) ≤ 2, we have 0 ≤ DKL(Pi||(P0 + P1)/2) ≤ log 2, and thus the constant CM in
(18) is well-defined.
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Theorem 7. For δ > 0 and hypotheses P0, P1 such that Aδ <∞ and n data points X drawn from P0, P1
with true change time k∗ ∈ (1, n), the MLE kˆ is (α, β)-accurate for any β > 0 and
α =
67
C2M
log
64
3β
. (19)
For hypotheses and data drawn this way with privacy parameter  > 0, OfflinePCPD(X,P0, P1, , δ, n)
is (α, β)-accurate for any β > 0 and
α = max{ 262
C2M
log
128
3β
,
2A log(16/β)
CM 
}. (20)
In both expressions, A = Aδ and CM = min
{
DKL(P0||P0+P12 ), DKL(P1||P0+P12 )
}
.
Proof. The general framework of this proof is similar to that of Theorem 5, but the main difference is that
Hoeffding’s inequality is not applicable in this general setting, since we allow ∆(`) to be unbounded. The
main idea in this proof is to consider the alternative log-likelihood ratio using the average distribution
(P0 + P1)/2, in which Bernstein inequality can be applied.
Following the notation from Theorem 5, given some true change-point k∗ and error tolerance α > 0,
we can partition the set of bad possible outputs k into sub-intervals of exponentially increasing size as
follows. For i ≥ 1, let
R−i = [k
∗ − 2iα, k∗ − 2i−1α)
R+i = (k
∗ + 2i−1α, k∗ + 2iα]
Ri = R
−
i ∪R+i
Then for any range-specific thresholds ti for i ≥ 1, we will still bound the probability of the bad event
as follows:
Pr[|k˜ − k∗| > α] ≤
∑
i≥1
Pr[max
k∈Ri
{`(k)− `(k∗)} > −ti] +
∑
i≥1
Pr[max
k∈Ri
{Zk − Zk∗} ≥ ti] (21)
We will re-define Uj to denote the i.i.d random variables with mean zero by the alternative log-likelihood,
and Sm to denote the sum of m i.i.d Uj as follows:
Uj =
{
− log 2P0(xj)
(P0+P1)(xj)
+DKL(P0||P0+P12 ), j < k∗
− log 2P1(xj)
(P0+P1)(xj)
+DKL(P1||P0+P12 ), j ≥ k∗
Sm =
{∑
k∗+m≤j<k∗ Uj , m < 0∑
k∗≤j<k∗+m Uj m > 0
With these random variables, we can bound the empirical log-likelihood difference between the true
change-point k∗ and any candidate k by
1
2
[`(k)− `(k∗)] =
k∗∑
j=k
log
P1(xj)
P0(xj)
≤
{∑k∗−1
j=k Uj − (k∗ − k)DKL(P0||P0+P12 ), k < k∗∑k−1
j=k∗ Uj − (k − k∗)DKL(P1||P0+P12 ), k ≥ k∗.
Then we bound each term in the first set of terms in (21) for any i ≥ 1 and threshold ti = 2i−1αCM
as follows:
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Pr[max
k∈Ri
{`(k)− `(k∗)} > −2i−1αCM ]
≤ Pr[ max
k∈R−i
{
k∗−1∑
j=k
Uj − (k∗ − k)DKL(P0||P0 + P1
2
))} > −2i−2αCM ]
+ Pr[ max
k∈R+i
{
k−1∑
j=k∗
Uj − (k − k∗)DKL(P1||P0 + P1
2
)} > −2i−2αCM ]
≤ Pr[ max
k∈[2i−1α]
|S−k| > 2i−2αCM ] + Pr[ max
k∈[2i−1α]
|Sk| > 2i−2αCM ] (22)
≤
4 exp
(
− 2i−4αC2M
CM+32
)
1− 2 exp
(
− 2i−4αC2M
CM+32
) (23)
≤ 8 exp
(
−2
i−4αC2M
CM + 32
)
(24)
where (23) follows from an application of Corollary 4 with λ1 = λ2 = 2
i−3αCM and v = 4. To apply
Corollary 4, we first need to check the conditions of Bernstein inequality. We shall show that for any j,
E [exp(|Uj |)− 1− |Uj |] ≤ 2, (25)
and then all conditions of Bernstein inequality are fulfilled. To prove this, let Yj be the i.i.d. alternative
log-likelihood ratio as follows:
Yj =
{
− log 2P0(xj)
(P0+P1)(xj)
, j < k∗
− log 2P1(xj)
(P0+P1)(xj)
, j ≥ k∗
Then it suffices to note that
E [exp(|Uj |)] = E [exp(| log Yj − E [log Yj ] |)]
≤ E [exp(log Yj − E [log Yj ])] + E [exp(E [log Yj ]− log Yj)]
= E [Yj ] e−CM +
E [1/Yj ]
e−CM
≤ e−CM + 2
e−CM
,
and the fact that e−CM ∈ [1, 2].
It follows from direct calculations that the condition α ≥ 262
C2
M
log 128
3β
> 363/C2M implies 2 exp
(
− 2i−4αC2M
CM+32
)
<
1/2, which is used to simplify the denominator as in (24).
We now consider the sum of these terms over all i, which will be needed for the final bound on
Equation (21).
∑
i≥1
Pr[max
k∈Ri
{`(k)− `(k∗)} > −2i−2αCM ] ≤
16 exp
(
− 2−3αC2M
CM+32
)
1− exp
(
− 2−3αC2M
CM+32
)
≤ 64
3
exp
(
−αC
2
M
262
)
. (26)
The first term in (20) in the theorem statement ensures that the expression above is bounded by β/2,
as is required for the private algorithm.
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For non-private MLE, we bound each term in the first set of terms in (21) for any i ≥ 1 and threshold
ti = 0 as follows:
Pr[max
k∈Ri
{`(k)− `(k∗)} > 0]
≤ Pr[ max
k∈R−i
{
k∗−1∑
j=k
Uj − (k∗ − k)DKL(P0||P0 + P1
2
)} > 0]
+ Pr[ max
k∈R+i
{
k−1∑
j=k∗
Uj − (k − k∗)DKL(P1||P0 + P1
2
)} > 0]
≤ Pr[ max
k∈[2i−1α]
|S−k| > 2i−1αCM ] + Pr[ max
k∈[2i−1α]
|Sk| > 2i−1αCM ] (27)
≤
4 exp
(
− 2i−3αC2M
CM+8
)
1− 2 exp
(
− 2i−3αC2M
CM+8
) (28)
≤ 8 exp
(
−2
i−3αC2M
CM + 8
)
(29)
where (28) follows from an application of Corollary 4 with λ1 = λ2 = 2
i−2αCM and v = 4. It follows
from direct calculations that the condition α ≥ 67
C2
M
log 128
3β
> 92/C2M implies 2 exp
(
− 2i−3αC2M
CM+8
)
< 1/2,
which is used to simplify the denominator as in (29). Then, we consider the sum of these terms over all i.
∑
i≥1
Pr[max
k∈Ri
{`(k)− `(k∗)} > 0] ≤
16 exp
(
− 2−2αC2M
CM+8
)
1− exp
(
− 2−2αC2M
CM+8
)
≤ 64
3
exp
(
−αC
2
M
67
)
. (30)
For α as in (19) in the theorem statement, the expression above is bounded by β, completing the
accuracy proof for the non-private MLE.
The calculations for the probability bounds for the Laplace noise terms are the same as those in
Theorem 5 with C substituted by 2CM , which ends up with a probability no more than another β/2
under the condition α ≥ 2A log(16/β)
CM 
.
By Inequality (21), this guarantees that Pr[|k˜ − k∗| > α] ≤ β for the assumed ranges of α captured in
Equation (20) in the theorem statement, completing the proof.
4 Online private change-point detection
In this section, we give a new differentially private algorithm for change point detection in the online
setting, OnlinePCPD. In this setting, the algorithm initially receives n data points x1, . . . , xn and then
continues to receive data points one at a time. As before, the goal is to privately identify an approximation
of the time k∗ when the data change from distribution P0 to P1. Additionally, we want to identify this
change shortly after it occurs.
Our offline algorithm is not directly applicable because we do not know a priori how many points
must arrive before a true change point occurs. To resolve this, OnlinePCPD works like AboveThresh,
determining after each new data entry arrives whether it is likely that a change occurred in the most
recent n entries. When OnlinePCPD detects a sufficiently large (noisy) partial log likelihood ratio
`(k) =
∑j
i=k log
P1(xi)
P0(xi)
, it calls OfflinePCPD to privately determine the most likely change point k˜ in
the window {xj−n+1, . . . , xj}.
Privacy of OnlinePCPD is immediate from composition of AboveThresh and OfflinePCPD, each
with privacy loss /2. As before, accuracy requires X to be drawn from P0, P1 with some true change
point k∗. This algorithm also requires a suitable choice of T to guarantee that OfflinePCPD is called
for a window of data that actually contains k∗. Specifically, T should be large enough that the algorithm
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is unlikely to call OfflinePCPD when j < k∗ but small enough so that it is likely to call OfflinePCPD
by time j = k∗ + n/2. When both of these conditions hold, we inherit the accuracy of OfflinePCPD,
with an extra logn factor arising from the fact that the data are no longer distributed exactly as in the
change-point model after conditioning on calling OfflinePCPD in a correct window.
With our final bounds, we note that n A
C
log(k∗/β) suffices for existence of a suitable threshold, and
an analyst must have a reasonable approximation of k∗ in order to choose such a threshold. Otherwise,
the accuracy bound itself has no dependence on the change-point k∗.
Algorithm 4 Online private change-point detector : OnlinePCPD(X,P0, P1, , n, T )
Input: database X, distributions P0, P1, privacy parameter , starting size n, threshold T
Let A = maxx log
P1(x)
P0(x)
−minx′ log P1(x
′)
P0(x′)
Let Tˆ = T + Lap(4A/)
for each new data point xj , j ≥ n do
Compute `j = maxj−n+1≤k≤j `(k)
Sample Zj ∼ Lap( 8A )
if `j + Zj > Tˆ then
Output OfflinePCPD({xj−n+1, . . . , xj}, P0, P1, /2, 0, n) + (j − n)
Halt
else
Output ⊥
end if
end for
Theorem 8. For arbitrary data X, OnlinePCPD(X,P0, P1, , n, T ) is (, 0)-differentially private.
Theorem 9. For hypotheses P0, P1 such that ∆(`) <∞, a stream of data points X with starting size n
drawn from P0, P1 with true change time k
∗ ≥ n/2, privacy parameter  > 0, and threshold T ∈ [TL, TU ]
with
TL := 2A
√
2 log
64k∗
β
− C + 16A

log
8k∗
β
,
TU :=
nC
2
− A
2
√
n log(8/β)− 16A

log
8k∗
β
,
we have that OnlinePCPD(X,P0, P1, , n, T ) is (α, β) accurate for any β > 0 and
α = max
{
16A2
C2
log
32n
β
,
4A
C
log
8n
β
}
.
In the above expressions, A = ∆(`) and C = min{DKL(P0||P1), DKL(P1||P0)}.
Proof. We first give a range [TL, TU ] of thresholds that ensure that except with probability β/4, the
randomly sampled data stream satisfies the following two conditions:
1. For T ≥ TL, maxk∈[j−n+1,j] `(k) < T − α′ for every j < k∗.
2. For T ≤ TU , maxk∈[k∗−n/2,k∗+n/2) `(k) > T + α′.
When these conditions are satisfied, the AboveThresh guarantee ensures that except with probability
β/4, the randomness of the online algorithm ensures that it calls the offline algorithm on a window of
data containing the true change-point. Then we will argue that our overall accuracy follows from the
offline guarantee, where we will allow failure probability β/2.
We will get the first condition by taking a union bound over all windows tested before the change
point of the probability that the maximum log-likelihood maxk `(k) for n elements X = (x1, . . . , xn)
sampled from P0 exceed a given threshold. To bound this probability, we first define the following random
variables.
Uj = − log P0(xj)
P1(xj)
+DKL(P0||P1) Sm =
∑
1≤j≤m
Uj
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We note that each `(k) is the sum of i.i.d. random variables, and that the maximum log-likelihood over
m consecutive elements is equal in distribution to maxk∈[m] Sk − kDKL(P0||P1). This yields the first
inequality below. Inequality (31) comes from applying Corollary 2 with λ1 = λ2 = 2
i−2C + t/2 and
interval length L = A.
Pr
[
max
1≤k≤n
`(k) > t
]
≤
∑
i≥1
Pr[ max
k∈[2i−1,2i)
{Sk − kDKL(P0||P1)} > t]
≤
∑
i≥1
Pr[ max
k∈[2i−1]
Sk > 2
i−1C + t]
≤
∑
i≥1
2 exp(−(2i−2C + t/2)2/(2i−2A2))
1− 2 exp(−(2i−2C + t/2)2/(2i−2A2)) (31)
≤4
∑
i≥1
exp(−(2i−2C + t/2)2/(2i−2A2)) (32)
≤8 exp(−(2−1C + t/2)2/(2−1A2)) (33)
Inequalities (32) and (33) follow by plugging in t = 2A
√
2 log 64k
∗
β
− C. This ensures that 1 −
2 exp(−(2i−2C + t/2)2/(2i−2A2)) ≥ 1/2, giving Inequality (32), and that the series is increasing ex-
ponentially in i, so we can collapse the sum with another factor of 2 by considering only i = 1 as in
Inequality (33). This value of t also ensures that the bound of Inequality (33) is at most β/(8k∗). Taking
the union bound over all the windows prior to the change-point, this shows that Condition 1 holds for
TL = 2A
√
2 log 64k
∗
β
− C + α′ except with probability β/8.
To show that the second condition holds except with additional probability β/8, we consider the
window of data with the first half of data drawn from P0 and the second half drawn from P1 and bound the
probability that `(k∗) in this window is less than a given threshold as follows. We note that `(k∗) is the sum
of n/2 i.i.d. random variables, so we define mean-zero random variables Vj = − log P1(xj)P0(xj) +DKL(P1||P0)
and bound their sum using Hoeffding’s inequality:
Pr[ max
k∗−n/2≤k<k∗+n/2
`(k) < t] ≤ Pr[`(k∗) < t]
≤ Pr[
∑
k∈[n/2]
Vj > nC/2− t]
≤ exp(−4(nC/2− t)2/(nA2)) (34)
Plugging in t = nC
2
− A
2
√
n log(8/β) in this final expression ensures that (34) ≤ β/8. This ensures that
Condition 2 is satisfied except with probability β/8 for TU = nC/2−A
√
2 log(8/β)− α′.
Then we can instantiate the AboveThresh accuracy guarantee with privacy parameter /2 and
accuracy parameter β/4 to ensure that for α′ = 16A log(8k
∗/β)

when Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied,
AboveThresh will identify a window containing the true change-point except with probability β/4.
Combining this with the β/4 probability that Conditions 1 and 2 fail to hold when T ∈ [TL, TU ], we get
that OnlinePCPD calls OfflinePCPD in a window containing the change-point except with probability
β/2 over the randomness of the data and of the online portion of the algorithm.
We next instantiate OfflinePCPD with appropriate parameters to ensure that conditioned on being
called in the correct window, it will output a k˜ that is within α of the true change-point k∗ with probability
at most β/2. We can then complete the proof by taking a union bound over all the failure probabilities.
Our offline accuracy guarantee requires data points sampled i.i.d. from P0 before the change point and
from P1 thereafter, so it remains to show that conditioning on the event that we call the offline algorithm
in a correct window does not harm the accuracy guarantee too much. For a window size n, change-point
k∗, stream X of at least k∗ + n/2 data points, set of random coins required by OnlinePCPD and its call
to OfflinePCPD, and a stopping index k > n/2, let N(k) denote the event that OnlinePCPD calls
OfflinePCPD on a window centered at k, and let F (k) denote the event that OfflinePCPD on the
window centered at k fails to output an approximation within α of k∗.
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Our previous argument bounds the probability of all N(k) for k outside of a good range G =
(k∗ − n/2, k∗], and our offline guarantee bounds the probability of F (k) for any k ∈ G as long as the
data are drawn according to the change-point model. Then the overall probability of a bad event can be
bounded as follows, where the probability is over the X drawn from P0 and P1 with change-point k
∗ and
of the randomness of the algorithm:
Pr[|k˜ − k∗| > α] =
∑
k>n/2
Pr[N(k) ∩ F (k)]
≤
∑
k 6∈G
Pr[N(k)] +
∑
k∈G
Pr[F (k)]
The first summation is at most β/2 by our previous arguments. By instantiation of Theorem 5 for
OfflinePCPD with a β/(2n) and /2, the second summation is also bounded by β/2 when α =
max{ 32A2
C2
log 64n
β
, 8A
C
log 16n
β
}.
5 Numerical studies
We now report the results of Monte Carlo experiments designed to validate the theoretical results of
previous sections. We only consider our accuracy guarantees because the nature of differential privacy
provides a strong worst-case guarantee for all hypothetical databases, and therefore is impractical and
redundant to test empirically. Our simulations consider both offline and online settings for two canonical
problems: detecting a change in the mean of Bernoulli and Gaussian distributions.
We begin with the offline setting to verify performance of our OfflinePCPD algorithm. We use
n = 200 observations where the true change occurs at time k∗ = 100. This process is repeated 104 times.
For both the Bernoulli and Gaussian models, we consider the following three different change scenarios,
corresponding to the size of the change and parameter selection for OfflinePCPD. For each of these
cases, we consider privacy parameter  = 0.1, 0.5, 1,∞, where  = ∞ corresponds to the non-private
problem, which serves as our baseline. The results are summarized in Figure 1, which plots the empirical
probabilities β = Pr[|k˜ − k∗| > α] as a function of α.
(A) Large change. Bernoulli model: detecting a change from p0 = 0.2 to p1 = 0.8. Gaussian model:
detecting a change from µ0 = 0 to µ1 = 1.
(B) Small change. Bernoulli model: detecting a change from p0 = 0.2 to p1 = 0.4. Gaussian model:
detecting a change from µ0 = 0 to µ1 = 0.5.
(C) Misspecified change Bernoulli model: algorithm tests for change from p0 = 0.2 to p1 = 0.4 when
true distributions have p0 = 0.2 and p1 = 0.8. Gaussian model: algorithm tests for change from
µ0 = 0 to µ1 = 0.5 when true distributions have µ0 = 0 and µ1 = 1.
Figure 1 highlights three positive results for our algorithm when data is drawn from Bernoulli or
Gaussian distributions: accuracy is best when the true change in data is large (plots a and d) compared to
small (plots b and e), accuracy deteriorates as  decreases for stronger privacy, and the algorithm performs
well even when the true change is larger than that hypothesized (plots c and f). This figure emphasizes
that our algorithm performs well even for quite strong privacy guarantees ( < 1). The misspecified
change experiments bolster our theoretical results substantially, indicating that our hypotheses can be
quite far from the distributions of the true data and our algorithms will still identify a change-point
accurately.
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(a) Bernoulli, large change
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(b) Bernoulli, small change
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(c) Bernoulli, misspecified change
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(d) Gaussian, large change
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(e) Gaussian, small change
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(f) Gaussian, misspecified change
Figure 1: Accuracy for large change, small change, and misspecified change Monte Carlo simu-
lations with Bernoulli and Gaussian data. Each simulation involves 104 runs of OfflinePCPD
with varying  on data generated by 200 i.i.d. samples from appropriate distributions with
change point k∗ = 100.
We also run Monte Carlo simulations of our online change-point detection algorithm OnlinePCPD,
when the data points arrive sequentially and the true change occurs at time k∗ = 5000. We choose the
appropriate threshold T by setting a constraint that an algorithm must have positive and negative false
alarm rates both at most 0.1. The range of threshold T for the online algorithm needs to be non-empty,
which impacts our choice of sliding window size n. Unfortunately the window size of n = 200 used in
the offline simulations is not sufficient for our online examples. A larger window size is needed to detect
smaller changes or under higher levels of noise. For this reason, we choose window size n = 700 and
restrict our online simulations to the large change scenario (A) and privacy parameters  = 0.5, 1,∞.
For the online simulations, we use several key ideas in Section 4 to speed up the numerical search
of the threshold T . On the one hand, the threshold T cannot be too small, otherwise a false alarm will
be likely. To control the false alarm rate of 0.10 with up to k∗ = 5000 sliding windows, a conservative
lower bound of the threshold T is the 1− 0.10/5000 = 0.99998 quantile of the noisy versions of Wn with
n = 700 under the pre-change distribution. On the other hand, the threshold T cannot be too large,
otherwise it will fail to detect a true change in any sliding windows of size n = 700. A useful upper bound
of the threshold T is the 10% quantile of the noisy versions of CUSUM statistics Wn = max1≤k≤n `k with
n = 700 when the change occurs at time 350, since it will guarantee that the online algorithms raise an
alarm with probability at least 0.9 during the time interval [4650, 5350].
Next, we simulate 106 realizations of the CUSUM statistics Wn = max1≤k≤n `k with n = 700 in both
the pre-change and post-change cases. In each case, we speed up the computation of Wi by using the
recursive form Wi = maxWi−1, 0 + log(P1(Xi)/P0(Xi)) for i ≥ 1. The empirical quantiles of the noisy
versions of Wn with n = 700 under the pre- and post- change cases will yield the lower and upper bounds
of the threshold T . When the range of the threshold T is non-empty, we choose one that is closest to the
upper bound. For the Bernoulli model, we use T = 220 for all values of  = 0.5, 1,∞. In the Gaussian
model, our window size n = 700 is not sufficient to ensure non-empty range of T under false alarm rate
0.2 for  = 0.5, 1, so we relax the false alarm constraints for these  values and choose T = 180, 150, 100 for
 = 0.5, 1,∞, respectively. Figure 2 (c) indeed shows that the false alarm rates are high in the Gaussian
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model with  = 0.5, 1.
Figure 2 summarizes our online simulations results for both Bernoulli and Gaussian models using
a sliding window size n = 700 to detect a large change (scenario A) that occurs at time k∗ = 5000.
Suppose our online algorithm raises an alarm at time j with the estimated change-point k˜j for the
sliding window of the observations, {xj−n+1, · · · , xj}. Two probabilities are plotted: one is the marginal
probability of inaccurate estimation and false alarm, β1 = Pr(|k˜j − k∗| > α or k∗ /∈ (j − n+ 1, j)), and
the other is the conditional probability of inaccurate estimation conditioned on raising an alarm correctly,
β2 = Pr(|k˜j − k∗| > α|j − n+ 1 ≤ k∗ ≤ j). As α→∞, the probability β1 becomes the false alarm rate
plus the error rate related to the Laplace noise in hypothesis testing. For both Bernoulli and Gaussian
models, the right-hand side plots in Figure 2 (b and d) suggest that the online accuracy conditioned
on correctly raising an alarm is very similar to the offline accuracy. Our plots show that the primary
challenge in the online setting is determining when to raise an alarm in a sequence of sliding windows of
observations. Once such window is identified correctly, the offline estimation algorithm can be used to
accurately estimate the change-point.
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(a) Bernoulli, inaccurate estimation and
false alarm
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(b) Bernoulli, inaccurate estimation con-
ditioned on no false alarm
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(c) Gaussian, inaccurate estimation and
false alarm
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(d) Gaussian, inaccurate estimation con-
ditioned on no false alarm
Figure 2: Probability of inaccurate estimation and false alarm (left) and probability of accurate
report conditioned on raising an alarm correctly (right) for Monte Carlo simulations with
Bernoulli and Gaussian data. Each simulation involves 106 runs of OnlinePCPD with window
size n = 700 and varying  on data generated by i.i.d. samples from appropriate distributions
with change point k∗ = 5000.
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